v1n11: Hidalgo on Snyder: Paying a Living Wage

“Do Employers Have Obligations to Pay Their Workers a Living Wage?” by Javier Hidalgo

A COMMENT ON Jeremy Snyder (2008), “Needs Exploitation,” Ethic Theory & Moral Prac 11(4): 389–405.

Abstract: Jeremy Snyder argues that employers have obligations to pay their workers a living wage if workers stand in relationships of dependence with their employers. I argue that Snyder’s argument for this conclusion faces a dilemma. Snyder can adopt either a descriptive or a moralized account of dependence. If Snyder adopts a descriptive account, then it is false that dependence activates obligations to pay a living wage. If Snyder endorses a moralized account of dependence, then Snyder’s argument is circular. So, Snyder’s argument fails to establish that employers have obligations to pay their workers a living wage.

To download the full PDF, click here: Hidalgo on Snyder.

v1n10: Whelan Responds to Néron on Political CSR

“Political Corporate Social Responsibility: Some Clarifications,” by Glen Whelan

A RESPONSE TO Pierre-Yves Néron (2013), “Toward a Political Theory of the Business Firm? A Comment on ‘Political CSR’”, Bus Ethics J Rev 1(3): 14-21.

Abstract: Multinational Corporations (MNCs) engage in various political activities, can have significant political impacts, and can be designed with different political concerns in mind. In arguing that there is much theorizing to do in these regards, I recently outlined a critical research agenda for what I term the political perspective of corporate social responsibility (or political CSR for short). Whilst Néron acknowledges that the agenda I set out is important and valuable, he also suggests that the label I use – i.e. political CSR – is too constraining. I here make a number of clarifications that explain why this is not the case.

To download the full PDF, click here: Whelan Responds to Néron.

v1n9: Wettstein Responds to Smith on Corporate Political Responsibility

“Morality Meet Politics, Politics Meet Morality: Exploring the Political in Political Responsibility” by Florian Wettstein

A RESPONSE TO Jeffery Smith (2013), “Corporate Human Rights Obligations: Moral or Political?”, Bus Ethics J Rev 1(2): 7-13.

Abstract: This brief response to Smith focuses on his distinction between moral and political responsibility in general and how it relates to human rights in particular. I argue that the notion of political responsibility as it is used in the debate on political CSR often does not exclude morality but is based on it.

To download the full PDF, click here: Wettstein on Smith.

v1n8: Heath Responds to Jaworski

“Market Failure or Government Failure? A Response to Jaworski” by Joseph Heath

A RESPONSE TO Peter Jaworski (2013), “Moving Beyond Market Failure: When the Failure is Government’s,” Bus Ethics J Rev 1(1): 1-6.

Abstract: Peter Jaworski objects to my “market failures” approach to business ethics on the grounds that in some cases I have mislabeled as “market failure” what are in fact instances of “government failure.” While acknowledging that my overall approach might better be refered to as “Paretian,” I resist Jaworski’s specific criticism. I argue that the term government failure should not be used to describe market transactions that are made less efficient through government intervention, but should be reserved for cases in which the market mechanism has been suspended and the transaction is occurring, inefficiently, through the organizational power of the state.

To download the full PDF, click here: Heath on Jaworski.

v1n7: Mayer Responds to Zwolinski

“The Cost of Usury” by Robert Mayer

A RESPONSE TO Matt Zwolinski (2013), “Are Usurious? Another New Argument For the Prohibition of High Interest Loans?”, Bus Ethics J Rev 1(4): 22–27.

Abstract: When states deregulate the price of payday loans, most consumers will pay more for emergency cash than when a moderate usury cap is imposed. But advocates of price deregulation, including Matt Zwolinski, fail to discuss the distributive effects of their favored policy or to explain why most borrowers should pay more than is necessary for a cash advance. The objections Zwolinski raises against my argument for imposing a usury ceiling in this market miss the mark because they do not justify the increased cost consumers must bear when the price of a payday loan is allowed to float.

To download the full PDF, click here: Mayer on Zwolinski.

v1n6: Hartman and Werhane on Porter and Kramer

“Proposition: Shared Value as an Incomplete Mental Model” by Laura P Hartman and Patricia H Werhane

A COMMENT ON Michael Porter and Mark Kramer (2011), “Creating Shared Value,” Harv Bus Rev 89(1/2): 62–77.

Abstract: Much of the attention of ethics scholars has focused on balancing self interest with the interests of others, equating self-interest with profit, or at least its acquisition, and presenting a dilemma to both companies and the stakeholder groups that socially responsible business practices might serve. We are in significant agreement with Porter and Kramer’s silver bullet to correct decision making based solely on increasing profit: the creation of “shared value.” However, we suggest three significant points of deviation from this thesis, resulting from our discomfort with features of the mental model(s) that Porter and Kramer use to structure their argument.

To download the full PDF, click here: Hartman and Werhane on Porter and Kramer.

v1n5: Martin on Norman

“The Unification Challenge” by Dominic Martin

A COMMENT ON Wayne Norman (2011), “Business Ethics as Self-Regulation: Why Principles That Ground Regulations Should Be Used to Ground Beyond-Compliance Norms as Well,” J Bus Ethics 102(1): 43-57, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-1193-2

Abstract: Wayne Norman argues that there should be more similarity or unity between the justifications for markets and the extra-legal norms that apply to market agents. I question two aspects of his claim. First, why does Norman refer to this view as a view about the self-regulation of market agents? Agents could self-regulate with many different norms, not necessarily norms informed by the justifications for markets. Second, asking for more similarity might create problems in terms of the liberty of market agents to pursue other morally relevant objectives. How are we to balance these other relevant objectives and the objectives of markets?

To download the full PDF, click here: Martin on Norman.

v1n2: Smith on Wettstein

“Corporate Human Rights Obligations: Moral or Political?” by Jeffery Smith
http://doi.org/10.12747/bejr2013.01.02

A COMMENT ON Florian Wettstein (2012), “CSR and the Debate on Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Great Divide,” Bus Ethics Q 22(4): 739–770.

Abstract: This discussion reviews Florian Wettstein’s conclusion that multinational corporations should assume greater “positive” obligations to protect against and remedy violations of human rights. It thereafter suggests an alternative to his defense that remains open to his conclusion, but sketches a moral, rather than political, grounding of those obligations.

To download the full PDF, click here: Smith on Wettstein.

Update: Now see also Wettstein Replies to Smith.